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Abstract 
Aviation maintenance technicians (AMTs) provide the technical and applied knowledge 
required to maintain airworthiness in aircraft.  In commercial aviation, maintenance tasks are 
performed across multiple shifts.  When AMTs share a maintenance task between shifts, the shift 
turnover strategy used may determine if information is effectively transferred between AMTs.  
Ineffective shift turnover strategies are a contributing factor in many aviation accidents and 
incidents.  Additionally, time constraints on certain maintenance tasks may cause AMTs to 
commit error when performing a task.  The present study examined the effect of shift turnover 
strategy (face-to-face or written) and time pressure on error capture, accuracy, and completion 
time of a maintenance task that was shared between two shifts.  Forty AMT students completed 
an unfinished maintenance task while subjected to conditions of shift turnover strategy and time 
pressure.  Three dependent variables, the number of skill-based errors, the number of trigger 
event errors, and task completion time measured AMT performance.  Results indicate that the 
face-to-face shift turnover strategy was significantly more effective in preventing trigger event 
errors than the written strategy.  Additionally, AMTs under time pressure completed the task 
significantly faster than AMTs not under time pressure.  Therefore, the current study partially 
supports the argument to require face-to-face shift turnover strategies in aviation maintenance.  
Thus, the use of the face-to-face strategy may increase AMTs understanding of the task, as 
suggested in the literature.   
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Introduction 
Aviation maintenance is one of many critical systems in air transportation.  This system 
relies on a number of assets to effectively maintain aircraft.  Perhaps the most important asset to 
this system is the Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT).  AMTs provide the technical and 
applied knowledge required to maintain airworthiness in aircraft.  However, their ability to do so 
requires constant and effective communication with each other, especially between shifts.  A 
critical point in aviation maintenance where effective communication is required is during a shift 
change.  Consequently, the method of communication between different shifts is often influenced 
by the organizational culture of the company.   
Concurrently, increased demand for flight-ready aircraft is reducing the time an AMT is 
allocated to complete repairs.  In some situations, time constraints may cause the AMT to 
commit error when performing a task.  The accident case of Alaska Airlines Flight 261 
exemplifies these situations.   
On the afternoon of January 31, 2000, while in route to San Francisco International 
Airport, Alaska Airlines Flight 261 crashed into the Pacific Ocean about three miles off the coast 
of California.  All persons onboard suffered fatal injuries.  The primary cause of the accident was 
a mechanical failure of the jackscrew trim system, which controlled pitch for the aircraft via a 
horizontal stabilizer (see Figure 1).  The retaining nut of the jackscrew sheared off in-flight, 
causing the aircraft to pitch violently in a nose-down attitude, subsequently leading to loss of 
aircraft control.  
An investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that an 
extension of the scheduled maintenance interval of this particular jackscrew allowed Alaska 
Airlines to continue to operate the aircraft well beyond the recommended maintenance interval.  
Additionally, the NTSB recognized the organizational culture at Alaska Airlines as ―inadequate‖.  
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More specifically, the use of ―pencil-whipping‖ was prevalent in many of the company‘s aircraft 
inspections (National Transportation Safety Board, 2003).  In fact, an Alaska Airlines aircraft 
maintenance inspector found that the jackscrew was out of specifications and deemed the aircraft 
unairworthy, until replacement of the jackscrew.  He documented this statement on the aircraft 
maintenance work order form and left for the day.  The next shift supervisor did not agree with 
the decision and because of time pressure to return the aircraft to service, crossed out the 
previous inspector‘s instructions and signed-off the aircraft as airworthy.  The failure of 
communication between the two shifts involved is perhaps the most disturbing causal factor of 
this accident.   
   
 
Figure 1.  The jackscrew is a 2-foot-long, 1-1/2-inch-diameter threaded shaft that moves up and 
down, raising and lowering the leading edge of the stabilizer, the wing structure on the tail that 
controls the plane's angle of flight. 
The previous tragedy identifies two distinct problems in aviation maintenance operations, 
―shift turnover communication‖ and ―time pressure‖.  As seen in this particular accident, a lack 
of face-to-face communication between work shifts may have resulted in the release of an 
unairworthy aircraft.  The problem of communication during shift turnovers lies within the 
organizational practices of each aviation maintenance company.  If Alaska Airlines had utilized 
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properly structured, face-to-face, shift turnover briefings, the outgoing inspector may have 
verbally stressed the dire importance of replacing the jackscrew to the incoming shift, which may 
have prevented this accident.  Moreover, the rapid pace of commercial aviation induces time 
pressures, as the industry itself relies upon constant availability of airworthy aircraft.  With the 
addition of time pressure, the incoming shift, in a rush to abide with schedule demands, made a 
critical error by not discussing the reported issue with the outgoing shift before releasing the 
aircraft.   
The present study aimed to determine the effect of shift turnover strategy (face-to-face 
communication or written communication) and time pressure on error capture, accuracy, and 
completion time of a maintenance task that was shared between two shifts.  The following 
literature review presents discussion on shift turnover related accidents in high-risk 
organizations, the aviation maintenance industry, shift turnover practices in the aviation 
maintenance, and if shared mental model theory may improve cohesion between shift workers.  
 Shift turnover accident examples 
Similar to aviation maintenance, many other high-risk industries rely upon 24-hour 
operations.  To accomplish tasks across multiple shifts, workers must communicate important 
information regarding the tasks during a shift change.  When proper communication does not 
occur, dire consequences follow, as documented by the following cases.   
The Sellafield Beach incident.  In November 1983, workers at British Nuclear Fuels 
Limited‘s Sellafield Works accidentally discharged highly radioactive liquid waste into the sea.  
An investigation found that, due to a failure of communication between shifts, a tank, which was 
assumed to contain a liquid suitable for discharge to the sea, in fact, contained highly radioactive 
material that created an environmental hazard.  This incident occurred during a plant shutdown 
for routine annual maintenance.  As workers transferred a written description of the tank contents 
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from one shift log to the next across several consecutive shifts, the written description of the tank 
contents changed from ―ejections from HASW‖ to ―ex HASW washout.‖  As a result, what had 
originally been interpreted as highly radioactive material was later interpreted as being low-level 
runoff suitable for discharge into the sea.  In this incident, the contents of the tank were 
described in terms of their origin rather than their nature.  Liquid waste, in this instance, is either 
categorized as highly active, medium active, or low level runoff.  Failure to accurately describe 
the tank's contents, coupled with transcription errors made as written logbook contents were 
copied from page to page, led to a misunderstanding (Miles, 1998).    
The Piper Alpha disaster.  In 1988, 167 workers were fatally injured when an offshore 
oil platform in the North Sea exploded and subsequently burned.  Failure of critical information 
transfer was a significant cause to this disaster.  Specifically, the outgoing shift did not notify the 
incoming shift of the inoperative condition of a commonly used valve.  Lack of this knowledge 
led to the incoming shift turning the valve, which initiated the disaster (Parke and Kanki, 2008).  
Investigators concluded that no written procedures for shift handover existed.  Additionally, 
there was no pre-determined analysis or categorization of important items to include in the 
handover (Miles, 1998).   
Continental Express flight 2547.  In 1991, Continental Express Flight 2574 crashed in a 
cornfield in Texas, killing all 14 onboard.  The NTSB determined that an outgoing maintenance 
shift failed to communicate to an incoming shift the importance of replacing the missing 
fasteners for the de-ice boot on the horizontal stabilizer.  Subsequently, the upper leading edge of 
the aircrafts horizontal stabilizer ripped off during flight, causing the pilots to lose control 
(National Transportation Safety Board,1992).   
The previous accidents exemplify the consequences of improper communication between 
shifts.  To understand why errors in shift turnover communication in an aviation maintenance 
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environment are prevalent, it is vital to understand the individuals involved, how they are trained 
and, the aviation maintenance industry.  
The aviation maintenance system 
The aviation maintenance system is complex and requires the collective effort of many 
professionals to transport thousands of people everyday safely.  The AMT is the key player in 
this system. 
Aviation maintenance technicians.  Aviation Maintenance Technicians perform the 
necessary repairs and inspections to maintain airworthiness on all certificated aircraft.  Title 14, 
Part 65 of the Code of Federal Regulations outlines AMT activities.  Specifically, Part 65.81 
provides a brief explanation of aircraft mechanics' rights and responsibilities.  It states that, "A 
certificated mechanic may perform or supervise the maintenance, preventive maintenance or 
alteration of an aircraft or appliance, or a part thereof, for which he is rated (but excluding major 
repairs to, and major alterations of, propellers, and any repair to, or alteration of, instruments), 
and may perform additional duties in accordance with sub-sections 65.85, 65.87, and 65.95‖ 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2010a).  The latter sub-sections briefly describe the 
requirements for an AMT to perform 100-hour inspections on an airframe or powerplant.  
Though these governing rights and responsibilities ensure that only certain people may perform 
the duties of an AMT, they only provide general guidelines and do not fully explain the rigorous 
detail that AMTs apply to ensure airworthiness.    
Professionalism in aviation maintenance.  Unlike other maintenance professions (e.g., 
automobile mechanic), AMTs are trained to be meticulous in every aspect.  Using the automobile 
mechanic as a comparison, differences in professionalism become evident.  First, an AMTs work 
will affect thousands of people in future flights.  This means that every task they perform must 
be done so with the highest level of accuracy.  AMTs maintain this high-level of accuracy by 
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following written procedures, as well as having their work double-checked by an inspector.  
Conversely, automobile mechanics are not required to follow written procedures, nor have their 
work inspected by a second person.  An automobile mechanic's work may only affect a few 
people, and in most cases, a malfunctioning vehicle can simply pull over.  Second, AMTs must 
possess a greater level of professionalism than automobile mechanics, combining such 
characteristics as competence, control and commitment to safety (Taylor & Thomas, 2003).  A 
simple comparison of a car mechanic's toolbox and an AMT's toolbox demonstrates the level of 
commitment to safety.  The automobile Mechanics toolbox is unorganized, with tools strung 
about, whereas an AMT's tools lie neatly placed in order.  Commonly referred to as a "shadowed 
box", each drawer of an AMTs toolbox has shaped holes that fit the exact tool that lies there.  
This ensures that no tools are accidently left onboard an aircraft.  The AMT simply checks his 
toolbox for missing tools, before the aircraft is released for flight.  Thirdly, for an AMT to 
perform maintenance on a certificated aircraft, he must possess a certificate issued by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), whereas car mechanics require no certification to work on 
automobiles.  
1
 
Training for aviation maintenance.  Aviation maintenance is a highly specialized field 
of work, which requires numerous hours of schooling compared to other maintenance programs.  
An AMT must accrue approximately 1900 contact hours of training to be eligible for testing, 
whereas an auto mechanic must only posses two years of unstructured hands-on experience to be 
eligible for ASE testing (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010c; National Institute for 
Automotive Service Excellence, 2009).  Aviation maintenance schools must retain certification 
from the FAA and must teach a specific list of topics.  These topics are split into three categories 
or ratings: Powerplant, Airframe, and General.  Both the Powerplant and the Airframe categories 
                                                          
1
 Thankfully, most reputable auto. mechanics possess certification from institutions such as the 
National Institute for Automotive Service Excellence (NIASE, 2009).   
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cover the technical knowledge required to service these aviation systems.  The General category, 
on the other hand, consists of basic math and English proficiency, common repair procedures, 
regulations and requirements, and most importantly, written documentation.  The written 
documentation portion of the General rating ensures AMTs are able to read procedural items 
such as maintenance manuals, airworthiness directives, work cards, as well as, effectively 
document repairs or alterations performed on an aircraft in a record or database (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2009).  The General rating does not include any training on 
interpersonal communication (Taylor & Christensen, 1998).  Other communication training may 
occur, but only at the discretion of individual AMT instructors. 
 Written documentation/”work cards”.  Written documentation plays a significant role 
in the successful operation of aviation maintenance.  AMTs rely on written documents to provide 
instructions on maintenance tasks as well as to ensure compliance with regulations.  There are 
numerous types of documents used in aviation maintenance.  The FAA provides regulatory 
documents, such as FARs and airworthiness directives, while aircraft manufacturers provide 
maintenance manuals, work cards, and service bulletins.  AMTs use work cards to show the 
progress of a task.  The use of work cards attempts to eliminate any chance for error by 
providing step-by-step instructions for maintenance tasks.  By checking-off each step of a task, 
an AMT can document his progression through a task.   
Aviation maintenance industry.  Aviation maintenance operates on a time-based 
schedule to keep airworthy aircraft available for thousands of daily flights.  A delay in flight 
schedules can cost thousands of dollars and possibly the choice of customers to purchase future 
flights with that airline.  This constant need to keep aircraft in a ready-to-fly state translates 
down to a necessity for an effective organizational structure and, ultimately, to effective job 
performance of AMTs.  
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Aviation maintenance is performed in many different environments, but the most familiar 
(in commercial aviation) include Line Maintenance Operations (LMOs) and hanger maintenance.  
AMTs that work in LMOs are often in view of the flying public and are part of the ramp crew 
(i.e., the crew that services the aircraft at the gate).  These AMTs work to solve issues (i.e., light 
maintenance) during the time the aircraft is cycling between passengers.  LMO mechanics are 
some of the most experienced technicians and therefore must be able to diagnose and repair 
problems rapidly.  It is rare that a maintenance task is not completed before a shift change occurs 
in LMOs, as their tasks usually take less than one hour to complete.  However, LMO mechanics 
have their share of time constraints, as the aircraft they service are typically in between flights.  
A maintenance task deemed beyond the capabilities of the LMO mechanics is moved to a 
maintenance hangar.   
The majority of aircraft maintenance in commercial aviation is performed in maintenance 
hangars, which are usually located just off the tarmac.  Maintenance performed in a hanger 
environment is deemed medium to heavy maintenance.  Medium maintenance tasks vary in time 
depending on the problem item.  For example, tire changes require a few hours, while, multipoint 
inspections require several hours.  Heavy maintenance tasks range in complexity and require 
several hours or in some cases up to several days to complete.  The AMT‘s that work in medium 
to heavy maintenance are  subjected to time pressures, as each maintenance task is allotted a 
certain time frame and must be completed in order to meet schedule demands.  Although aircraft 
maintenance is carried out in many environments, this paper will focus on hanger maintenance, 
as many maintenance tasks in this environment are performed across multiple shifts.   
Shift work in aviation maintenance 
Most medium to heavy maintenance is a 24-hour operation and therefore occurs over 
multiple shifts.  The likelihood that more than one shift will work on a single aircraft is high; at 
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times as many as 12 to 15 shifts work on a single aircraft (Parke & Kanki, 2008).  Multiple shifts 
imply that each shift is comprised of different AMTs.  Some tasks require multiple people to 
complete a task, while other tasks only require a single person.  If, for instance, a group of AMTs 
is performing a multipoint inspection on an aircraft and their shift ends, another group of AMTs 
takes over the inspections.  Regardless of how many AMTs there are on a team, it is generally 
the sole responsibility of the AMT working on a particular aircraft or component to brief the next 
shift of the critical information necessary to maintain a smooth transition.  This exchange of 
information is often informal, speedy, and requires not only interpersonal trust, but also the 
ability to communicate information concisely and completely.    
According to the FAA, shift turnovers are one of the critical phases of aviation 
maintenance and must be performed correctly (Federal Aviation Administration, 2005).  
Unfortunately,  current Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) do not directly address specific 
shift turnover practices in aviation maintenance and therefore the procedure in which they occur 
varries across maintnenance orginizations (Maddox, 1998).  In fact, FAR Part 121.369 only 
requires an organization's maintenance manual to contain, "Procedures to ensure that required 
inspections, other maintenance, preventative maintenance, and alterations that are not completed 
as a result of shift changes or similar work interruptions are properly completed before the 
aircraft is released to service" (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010b).  Essentially, this 
regulation only requires aviation maintenance organizations to complete any maintenance task 
they begin, yet does not require, or outline a structured shift turnover briefing.  An ideal aviation 
maintenance shift change includes (a) time for the outgoing person to prepare, (b) a shift 
handover, where outgoing and incoming persons exchange information that is relevant to the task 
that must be finished, and (c) "cross-checking" the outgoing persons' briefing, while enabling the 
incoming person to ask questions about the task (Miles, 1998).   
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Shift turnovers in aviation maintenance generally occur in two ways. There are written 
shift turnovers, where the shift-lead acts as a liaison between shifts, passing information from the 
previous shift to the incoming shift and there are face-to-face shift turnovers, where the outgoing 
shift communicates directly with the incoming shift.  These two types of information exchanges 
are also referred to as synchronous and asynchronous, respectively (Drury & Ma, 2003).   
Written shift turnover.  In a written shift turnover, little or no face-to-face 
communication occurs between the outgoing and incoming shifts.  Instead, a step-by-step 
progression of the task is documented in writing on a work card.  If an AMT‘s shift ends before 
he can complete a task, the general practice is to sign his name next to the last step he completed 
on the work card.  The AMT then hands over the written documentation to the shift lead and 
leaves for the day.  The shift lead then passes the written documentation from the outgoing AMT 
to the incoming AMT.  The incoming AMT then proceeds from the last step signed-off by the 
outgoing AMT to complete the task.  Though this may seem like a sound method of information 
transfer, there may be errors with the outgoing AMTs work.  Therefore, the incoming AMT must 
decide between two methods of completing the work: either trust the outgoing AMT‘s work and 
quickly finish all remaining tasks, or spend additional time checking over the outgoing AMT‘s 
work before continuing with the task.  A check over the outgoing AMT‘s work likely results in 
an increase in task completion time, thereby increasing the effect of time pressure, which may 
cause the AMT to make errors.  It is important to note that if the task is not completed in the 
allotted amount of time, the aircraft will not be released until the task is complete.  However, as 
time pressure increases, the AMT may speed through the task to make the deadline, possibly 
making critical errors, such as installing incorrect hardware.  
Face-to-face shift turnover.  In a face-to-face shift turnover, the outgoing AMT 
discusses the task directly with the incoming AMT.  By stopping his work early, the outgoing 
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AMT is able to gather all pertinent information related to the task for the incoming AMT.  This 
information includes what items have been completed in the task, what items remain, any 
changes that have occurred to the procedure (i.e., airworthiness directives), as well as any 
concerns about the task.  A shift turnover briefing then occurs, where the outgoing and incoming 
AMTs can directly discuss the task.  Having an opportunity to ask the outgoing AMT questions 
about the task, as well as crosscheck the outgoing AMTs work, the incoming AMT may have a 
higher probability in safely completing the task in the allotted amount of time.  
 Research on shift turnovers in aviation maintenance.  Currently, the use of written 
shift turnover reports is the predominant method of shift change in aviation maintenance, 
especially across multiple shifts (Parke & Kanki, 2008).  The prevalence of written shift 
turnovers in aviation maintenance organizations is likely because no FAA standardized shift 
turnover process exists.  Unfortunately, the indirect strategy may be ineffective.  According to 
Parke and Kanki (2008), vague and brief shift turnovers are a leading cause to the dispatch of 
unairworthy aircraft.  Parke and Kanki (2008) analyzed 46 Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS)
2
 reports that pertain to shift turnover communication issues.  They found that, when 
compared to non-turnover-communication-related reports, errors in part installation occurred 
much more frequently (50% vs.  27%) and of these installation instances, 96% carried a label of 
critical equipment installation versus 74% in non-turnover-communication-related incidents 
reports.  Additionally, they found that incidents that were deemed ―serious‖ such as, in-flight 
shut down and injury, occurred twice as often in reports involving shift turnover, than those that 
did not.  They found that the highest contributing factor in errors during a shift turnover were 
workcards, accounting for nearly half (46%).  This suggested the critical role that workcards play 
during a turnover and that increasing the completeness and accuracy of workcards would result 
                                                          
2
 ASRS reports are submitted on a voluntary basis and therefore do not fully represent the total 
amount of incidents that occur. 
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in a reduction of issues in shift turnover communication (Parke & Kanki, 2008).  Interestingly 
though, briefings were reported as a much lower contributing factor to errors (15%).  The 
researchers suggested that fewer errors may occur when verbal briefings are used during shift 
turnovers, but also may indicate that verbal briefings seldom occur (Parke & Kanki, 2008). All 
maintenance organizations utilize some form of written communication to document what 
maintenance activities occur.   
For example, discrepancies may exist in the written documentation and an alteration to 
the procedure of one of the tasks is necessary.  When a shift change occurs, the outgoing AMT 
may not provide a written explanation for the alteration of the procedure.  Without face-to-face 
communication between the incoming and outgoing AMT, the misinterpretation of the alteration 
can led to the incoming AMT making errors.  The incoming AMT may not share the same 
understanding or mental model of the maintenance task, aircraft configuration, or work cards.  
Additionally, the incoming AMT may have been away from work for an extended period and 
may not be aware of procedural changes, in which interpreting any written communication even 
more challenging.  Experience levels may also differ across shifts and an AMT may make 
assumptions about their knowledge that may not be true of other technicians (International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2003) which, again, interpretation of written remarks may prove difficult.   
Unsafe acts.  A lack of shift turnover communication in aviation maintenance may 
increase the likelihood of unsafe acts.  Hobbs and Williamson (2002) developed a 48-item 
survey that asked AMTs a series of questions regarding the occurrence of unsafe acts in the 
aviation maintenance domain.  The survey items contained specific language and technical detail 
appropriate to unsafe acts that occur in aviation maintenance.  A total of 1,359 of 4,600 AMTs, 
licensed by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, completed and returned the survey.  AMTs rated 
each item using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = ‗Never‘, 5 = ‗Very often‘).  The highest reported 
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unsafe acts include, ―Not referred to the maintenance manual or other approved documentation 
on a familiar job (M = 3.18)‖ and ―Been misled by confusing documentation (M = 2.84)‖.  The 
latter occurs when the AMT is confused by a previous shift's written communication.  This may 
indicate that often there are no face-to-face briefings between shifts and because the opportunity 
to ask questions did not exist, an unsafe act occurred (Hobbs and Williamson, 2002). 
AMTs' opinions on shift turnover briefings.  Organizations that have developed their 
own standardized shift turnover process show increased levels of trust and professionalism 
amongst their AMTs.  Taylor and Thomas (2003) surveyed 3,150 AMTs across five aviation 
maintenance companies using the Maintenance Resource Management Technical Operations 
Questionnaire.  The survey was comprised of 34 items that measure attitudes and opinions 
related to aviation maintenance functions.  Participants were asked to express their agreement or 
disagreement to a series of statements.  Results indicated a high level of trust and 
professionalism amongst team members.  Particularly, when asked their opinions of the 
statements ―Debriefing after major task is important‖ and ―Start of shift meetings are important‖, 
AMTs responded with agreement, across all but one company (Taylor and Thomas, 2003). 
Group discussions.  Group discussions can also improve shift turnover communication 
by allowing members to capture problems and discuss intent, rather than reading written 
documentation of what occurred in previous shifts.  Parke and Mishkin (2005) demonstrated this 
notion by observing the evolution of shift turnovers in an interplanetary robotic control program.  
By analyzing errors made by a previous robotic rover control program, they gained insight on 
how to improve the next mission.  The program implemented ―best practices,‖ including a shift 
turnover meeting, in which operators discussed past issues as well as future pathing or direction 
of travel of the robot.  All operators from both outgoing and incoming shifts, as well as 
managers, attended the shift turnover meetings.  The program involved three shifts that 
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controlled a robotic rover on Mars.  The accuracy and attention to detail required to maneuver a 
robot on Mars necessitates a need for effective shift turnover communication.  Any errors can 
have dire future consequences, due to the delay of time from controller input to robot maneuver.  
An improvement in reduction of errors, as well as an increase in efficiency in robot operation 
was attained by implementing the shift turnover meetings.  Additionally, Parke and Mishkin 
(2005) developed and proposed a generalized checklist that outlines the typical communicative 
items that occur during a shift change, which was derived from shift turnover literature.  
 Coordination.  Coordination during a shift turnover may decrease the likelihood of 
errors.  Suzuki, von Thaden, and Geibel (2008) analyzed 680 ASRS reports, ranging from 
August 2004 to July 2006, pertaining to FAR Part 121 scheduled airline operations to identify 
contributing factors in aviation maintenance related incidents.  A combination of a qualitative 
analysis and categories from the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2003) were applied to the narrative reports.  Subject matter experts classified 
communication and coordination issues, and then divided the reports into nine categories.  Errors 
related to ―lack of vigilance‖ occurred the most times (n = 421), while ―coordination‖ errors 
occurred in 17% (n = 115) of the reports.  Not surprisingly, errors related to ―time pressure‖ had 
the third highest occurrence (n = 146).  AMT‘s reported not paying attention when they missed a 
task or not being aware of the task entirely.  It was also suggested that because AMTs also 
reported a high level of multi-tasking, their attention level was reduced in order to cope with 
multiple tasks under time pressure.  Most significantly, time pressures showed a positive 
association with decision-making errors, whereas routine violations showed a negative 
relationship to time pressures.  Though shift turnover communication errors were not directly 
investigated, the results of this study cite coordination and communication in aviation 
maintenance operations as critical in preventing errors.  A proper shift turnover may increase 
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coordination and communication in aviation maintenance teams (Suzuki, von Thaden, and 
Geibel, 2008). 
Maintenance Resource Management 
 Literature on Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) provides further precedence 
for the need of improved communication in shift turnovers.  The FAA describes MRM as a 
"process for improving communication, effectiveness, and safety in aircraft maintenance 
operations" (FAA, 2000, p. 6) which addresses "teamwork deficiencies within the aviation 
maintenance environment" (p. 6).  As mentioned previously, written communication is dominant 
in the aviation maintenance environment.  This notion is generally true for all the players 
involved, including management, inspectors, parts clerks, tool clerks, and even FAA inspectors.  
The only exception is if the organization has received training that specifically deals with 
interpersonal and intrapersonal communication, such as the more popular MRM programs that 
are spreading throughout the industry.  MRM programs have shown success in improving 
communication amongst aviation maintenance personnel.    
 Development of MRM.  Derived from the more popular Crew Resource Management 
(CRM), MRM aims to reduce errors in the aviation maintenance environment through the 
understanding of human factors.  The first reported CRM program geared towards AMTs began 
in late 1989.  The need for MRM became apparent after the Aloha Airlines accident on April 28, 
1988, where the overall focus of blame shifted from the individual to the entire operational 
system.  Additionally, it revealed issues such as human performance limitations, teamwork, 
communication, organizational culture, and training (Patankar & Taylor, 2008).  Currently in its 
fourth generation, MRM has demonstrated a pattern of changing interest in the focus of 
organizational variables and longitudinal stability of post-training attitude and behavior changes 
(Taylor & Patankar, 2001). 
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 First Generation MRM.  As described by Taylor and Patankar (2001), the first 
generation of MRM training primarily focused on communication skills and awareness between 
AMTs.  Successful training was measured through individual attitude changes, rates of injuries 
and aircraft ground damage.  However, lack of continued organizational support hindered 
ongoing success of first generation MRM training.  Taylor and Patankar report that many first 
generation programs were either discontinued or forgotten following management or strategic 
changes.   
 Second Generation MRM.  Second generation programs primarily focused on direct 
communication (i.e., focus groups with AMTs) rather than impersonal classroom training.  The 
program was successful in reducing paperwork and logbook errors.  However, Taylor and 
Patankar note that second generation programs had the tendency to highlight prior issues rather 
than proactively teaching the avoidance of key factors before they become issues.  
 Third Generation MRM.  Third generation MRM programs focused on situational 
awareness and coping mechanisms, individual issues that affect safety, and encouraged 
organizational change, while directly targeting management and FAA inspectors (Taylor and 
Patankar, 2001).  These programs also helped to identify twelve major causes of maintenance 
errors, commonly named the "Dirty Dozen" (see Table 1); as of 2001, this list is included in all 
reported MRM programs implemented in North America since 1994 (Taylor and Patankar, 2001; 
FAA, 2005).  
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Table 1 
The "Dirty Dozen"  
1.  Lack of Communication 7.  Lack of Resources 
2.  Complacency 8.  Pressure 
3.  Lack of Knowledge 9.  Lack of Assertiveness 
4.  Distraction 10.  Stress 
5.  Lack of Teamwork 11.  Lack of Awareness 
6.  Fatigue 12.  ―Destructive‖ Workplace Norms 
 
Research on third generation training revealed a new concern.  Taylor & Christensen 
(1998) found that initial post-training reports showed AMTs showed enthusiasm and positive 
feelings towards MRM training.  However, after several months, Taylor reports that AMTs 
showed frustration and anger with MRM training.  When asked why, the AMTs reported a lack 
of managerial and organizational support for implementing training information and an 
uncertainty if the training had been successful for the organization.  Taylor concluded that the 
MRM training implemented at this specific company did not match the organizations leadership 
practices or environmental factors of the facility.  These findings encouraged MRM to evolve, 
once again, ensuring that the context of training fit the organizational and environmental factors.   
 Fourth Generation MRM.  The fourth (current) generation of MRM training programs 
has attempted to correct the weaknesses of previous generations by incorporating systems theory, 
actively identifying errors before they occur, while focusing on the individual behavior approach 
of the third generation to promote a structured communications process (Taylor and Patankar, 
2001).  The current generation is interested in measuring AMT attitudes not only on safety-
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related issues (such as whether AMTs feel their work impacts passenger safety), but also on 
organizational context issues such as leadership and environmental factors.  
 To further stress the importance of MRM training, the FAA issued an Advisory Circular 
(AC120-72) that provides guidelines in developing MRM programs (FAA, 2000).  Advisory 
Circulars are documents sent to all aviation organizations and are regarded as important 
recommendations from the FAA.  Essentially, this document provides the information and 
guidelines for an organization to design and implement an MRM training program.  The 
introduction and growth of MRM programs have made a positive contribution to improving 
safety in aviation maintenance.  Although MRM programs are currently ―recommended‖, they 
may become a requirement in the future.  Additionally, the issue of shift turnover communication 
is also growing equally in popularity and priority.  
Recent initiatives in improving shift turnover communication 
In 1998, the FAA published ―The Operator‘s Manual for Human Factors in Aviation 
Maintenance‖ with the intention of providing maintenance organizations guidelines for 
implementing human factors training.  Chapter 4 of this manual outlines eight challenges related 
to shift turnovers as the following:  
(1) high demand for teamwork and interpersonal communication skills, (2) need 
for structured and standardized policies and procedures, (3) need for a location 
that is conducive for discussion and planning, (4) ineffective verbal and written 
communication, (5) finishing workers are tired and want to depart facility, (6) 
lack of adequate shift overlap to provide time for one-on-one briefings between 
the team leaving and the team coming on, (7) absence of a process to ensure 
departing personnel have documented all tasks accomplished or started, (8) 
minimal training on procedures for shift/task turnover (FAA, 2005). 
 19 
 
Similar challenges with shift turnovers in aviation maintenance are discussed in chapter 7 
of the ―Guidance Material on the UK CAA Interpretation of Part-145 Human Factors and Error 
Management Requirements‖ (Civil Aviation Authority, 2003).  This document cites three basic 
elements that must occur for a successful shift turnover: "1) the outgoing person‘s ability to 
understand and communicate the important elements of the job or task being passed over to the 
incoming person.  2) the incoming person‘s ability to understand and assimilate the information 
being provided by the outgoing person.  3) a formalized process for exchanging information 
between outgoing and incoming persons and a place and time for such exchanges to take place".  
The NTSB issued a similar document (A-04-15, 16) that recommends implementing human 
factors training in aviation maintenance (NTSB, 2006).  All of these documents cite shift 
turnover communication as one of many problem areas that require immediate attention.   
The suggestions made by the regulatory bodies cumulate the necessity for a shared 
understanding or a ―shared mental model‖ between two shift workers.  Essentially, the steps they 
suggest for successful information exchange mirrors how researchers describe shared mental 
model theory (Mathieu, Rapp, Maynard, & Mangos, 2010). 
Shared Mental Model Theory  
A mental model is comprised of organized knowledge structures that enable individuals 
to interact with their environment (Mathieu et al., 2010).  People use mental models to predict 
and explain environmental changes, to identify and recall the way certain parts of the 
environment are grouped together, and to construct expectations for future events (Mathieu, 
Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000).  For instance, when an AMT encounters an 
aircraft part he has inspected many times in the past, he draws from the knowledge and 
experience of that part.  The theory of "shared mental models" extends the mental model concept 
to the team.  That is, a shared mental model refers to 2 or more teammates having a mutual 
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understanding of the task, their respective roles and responsibilities, procedures, and timing 
(Blickensderfer, Reynolds, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2010).  This mutual understanding allows 
teammates to work efficiently together, without high levels of communication (Blickensderfer, et 
al., 2010).  
According to Stout, Cannon-Bowers, and Salas (1996), preexisting shared mental models 
will not be important in situations where team members are allowed to freely communicate with 
each other when sharing a task, for example, AMTs working together on the same shift.  In this 
situation, the team has the ability to discuss the next moves, without relying on preexisting 
knowledge to complete a task.  On the other hand, in situations where communication is limited, 
such as one technician on one shift and his teammate on the next shift, shared mental models are 
crucial to team functioning, as they allow the members to predict the information and resource 
requirements of their teammates (Mathieu et al., 2000). 
Consider an aviation maintenance task, where a shift change occurs mid-task.  In the 
course of working on the part, ―Technician 1‖ has acquired information particular to that repair.  
He now has an understanding of the particular situation, the implications of the job, and any 
details specific to that case/job.  Thus, he now has a full, detailed mental model of the job.  It is 
essential for this understanding to be passed to the next worker (―Technician 2‖), and that 
Technician 1 and Technician 2 have a shared mental model of what needs to be done and details 
specific to the job.  Exchanging written documentation alone may not provide all information 
needed for workers on different shifts to acquire a shared mental model of the task.  If the 
inspection of the part is performed across two work shifts, both AMTs may need to 
communicate, face-to-face, in order to attain a shared mental model.  
 Implications of face-to-face communication in shift turnovers.  A number of 
arguments exist that support a positive outcome with the inclusion of face-to-face 
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communication in shift turnovers.  Face-to-face communication occurs when two or more people 
communicate verbally about a subject.  The value of this form of communication lies within the 
additional knowledge attained by either party.  Open discussions allow each person to fully grasp 
the idea being discussed.  Conversely, written communication may leave gaps, as the reader 
leaves what is written to interpretation.  The reader may contact the writer to ask questions, but 
in cases of shift changes, the writer may not be available for clarification.  
 Parke and Kanki (2008) suggest that adding face-to-face communication in shift 
turnovers helps teams to achieve a shared mental model by conveying gestures, eye contact, 
tones of voice, degrees of confidence, and other rich aspects of personal communication (Knapp, 
1995).  More importantly, all aspects of the task can be discussed in detail.  Direct face-to-face 
communication adds redundancy to written documentation used during a shift turnover by 
enabling the incoming AMT to ask questions, while allowing the outgoing AMT to provide 
feedback (Parke & Kanki, 2008).  Researchers agree that written communication alone is not as 
powerful in effective information transfer as a combination of written and face-to-face 
communication during a shift turnover (Coiera & Tombs, 1998; Suzuki, von Thaden, & Geibel, 
2008; Majoros, 2008; Parke & Kanki, 2008).    
Another issue in shared mental model generation is with differing experience levels 
between shifts.  In this sense, the task is familiar to the outgoing technician, but not the incoming 
technician.  When a person reads information, for instance a workcard, they may interpret and 
process that information differently than someone else.  Their understanding of the task, certain 
terminology, tools, and procedures is pulled from their long-term memory store and is combined 
with immediate environmental stimuli to formulate a mental model of the task (International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2003; Federal Aviation Administration, 2005).  When two shift 
technicians discuss the task face-to-face, the inexperienced technician can learn from the 
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experienced technician, where, if the inexperienced technician just read the workcard, he may 
not understand the task completely.   
Face-to-face communication may better allow both shifts to share ideas, recall past 
experiences, and make accurate predictions of what may occur when performing the task.  Body 
gestures, facial expressions, and tone of voice help to focus attention to details (Parke & 
Mishkin, 2005).  For example, the inspectors involved in the Alaska Airlines accident did not 
communicate face-to-face.  Though the outgoing inspector requested in writing that the 
jackscrew be replaced, the incoming inspector disregarded the written instructions and released 
the aircraft.  If these two inspectors had participated in a face-to-face shift turnover, the incoming 
inspector may have made a different decision because of his perception of the danger involved in 
not replacing the jackscrew, as shown by the facial expressions and tone of voice of the outgoing 
inspector.  Even with the addition of face-to-face communication and improved shared mental 
models to shift turnovers, the AMT is still subjected to time pressure when completing the task 
left by the previous shift, and time pressure may have additional implications for task 
performance.   
 Time pressure.  In an effort to reduce costs and maximize profits, commercial aviation 
companies are streamlining their operational processes.  To remain competitive, companies are 
decreasing turnaround time for aircraft repairs.  This decrease in turnaround time leads to an 
increase of time pressure placed on the technicians performing the repairs.  When time pressures 
increase, the chance of committing errors may also increase.  Even with the appropriate 
documentation (e.g., maintenance manuals, work cards), AMT‘s continue to make mistakes on 
repairs when subjected to time pressure.  Suzuki, Von Thaden, & Geibel (2008) found that time 
pressure (n = 145, 27.5%) was the second major contributing factor found in 680 ASRS incident 
reports related to maintenance error.  The most significant contributing factor was lack of 
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vigilance (n = 418, 79.3%).  AMT‘s reported not paying attention when they missed a task or not 
being aware of the task entirely.  It was also suggested that because AMTs also reported a high 
level of multi-tasking, their attention level was reduced in order to cope with multiple tasks 
under time pressure.  Most significantly, time pressures showed a positive association with 
decision-making errors, whereas routine violations showed a negative relationship to time 
pressures.  However, it can be speculated that an AMT who has an elevated understanding of the 
task may be more resistant to time pressure, where if he did not interact with the previous shift, 
the pressure of completing the task on time may cause slips and unsafe acts. 
AMTs must retain and use a certain amount of domain specific rules to effectively make 
repairs (acquired in training).  These rules vary from knowledge of tool usage to specific rivet 
patterns on a wing repair.  AMTs then use these specific rules, combined with the written 
procedures to repair aircraft.  However, when AMTs are subjected to time pressures, these rules 
become ever more important, as they must be able to recall and implement the rules without 
hesitation.  In a study on emergency decision making while under time pressure, Lin and Su 
(1998) found that time pressure had a destructive effect on the performance of rule-based 
reasoning.  Additionally, people under time pressure suffered a significant decrease in accuracy 
when implementing the domain rules compared to those who were not subjected to time pressure 
(Lin and Su, 1998).   
The way people cope with time pressure varies dependent on the situation and task 
knowledge.  Chu and Spires (2001) suggest that people cope with time pressure using three 
strategies.  The first coping mechanism, a process termed acceleration, occurs when people may 
try to process the same amount of information, but at a faster rate.  The second coping 
mechanism, termed filtration, occurs when people process only a subset of available information, 
usually the most important information.  The third coping mechanism, termed process changes, 
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occurs when people change or modify their decision processes.  These process changes vary 
from a moderate change (switching from a compensatory process to a non-compensatory 
process) to an extreme change (avoidance or escaping from the task).  Additionally, filtration and 
acceleration may be combined in some situations, where the person focuses on a portion of the 
total available information and processes it faster (Chu & Spires, 2001). 
The way people make decisions while performing complex tasks may be dependent on 
the level of time pressure induced and their experience with the task.  In a study of decision 
making in dynamic environments, Gonzalez (2004) found that performance during a complex 
task degraded in people under severe time pressure than those who had more time for reflective 
decision making in the same complex task.  Those people under severe time pressure had three 
times more practice sessions than those in the less stringent time pressure group.  Gonzalez 
suggested that performing a task several times, under severe time pressure, results in poorer 
overall performance in future incidents of the same task.  Where, performing a task, under low 
time pressure, results in better performance when the task is encountered in the future (Gonzalez, 
2004). 
Summary of literature review 
Incorrect information transfer between shift workers is a causal factor in accidents and 
incidents in complex systems.  The complexity of the aviation maintenance system requires its 
technicians to have a high-level of professionalism and training.  Concurrently, technicians are 
placed under time pressures to keep pace with a constant demand system.  A critical element in 
aviation maintenance is information exchange, and this is particularly tricky during shift 
changes.  Inadequate communication between shifts has led to costly errors in aviation 
maintenance as well as other high-risk industries.  Problems identified in the literature point to 
documentation comprehension, misunderstandings of a previous shifts work, and loss of 
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attention.  Currently, technicians primarily use written documents when transferring information 
between shifts.  Written documents alone, however, may not provide other unique rich qualities 
one would receive in a face-to-face conversation.  The evolution of MRM has helped in 
recognizing the issue of improper shift turnovers.  Its contribution has provided insight on the 
capabilities of AMTs, as well as identified the major issues in aviation maintenance 
communication.  The success of MRM programs paved the way for more detailed research in 
specific issue areas, such as shift turnover communication.  
The addition of face-to-face to written information provides redundancy to shift 
turnovers, by allowing both shifts to actively interact and possibly develop a shared mental 
model of the task being handed over.  A face-to-face shift change may help AMTs to ensure 
critical information is understood and successfully transferred to the next shift. 
Statement of Problem  
Based upon the above literature review, written shift turnover practices may not be 
suitable for complete transfer of information between shifts.  Therefore, the present study aimed 
to determine the effect of shift turnover strategy (face-to-face or written) and time pressure on 
error capture, accuracy, and completion time of a maintenance task that was shared between two 
shifts. 
Statement of hypotheses 
This research attempted to distinguish which type of shift turnover is best suited for 
aviation maintenance in time-sensitive situations.  It was expected that the turnover strategy 
would affect AMT performance, specifically; 
H1a: AMTs subjected to a written shift turnover would make more errors on a 
maintenance task than AMTs who received a face-to-face briefing. 
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H1b: AMTs who received a written shift turnover would take longer to perform a 
maintenance task than AMTs who receive a face-to-face shift briefing. 
Additionally, it is was expected that time pressure would influence maintenance task 
performance, specifically; 
H2: AMTs who were subjected to time pressure would make more errors than AMTs 
who were given ample time to complete a maintenance task. 
Finally, it was expected that the type of shift turnover would moderate the effect of time pressure 
on performance, such that; 
H3: AMTs who received a face-to-face shift turnover would be less impacted by time 
pressure than AMTs who received a written shift turnover. 
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Method 
Participants  
A sample of 40 students (M = 25.2 years) enrolled in the Aviation Maintenance Science 
program at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University participated in the study.  This sample was 
selected due to the specialties and criticalities required to accurately represent the population of 
aviation maintenance technicians.  Males (87%) represented the majority of the sample and 
females represented only 13%.  The researcher recruited participants by directly addressing 
AMT classes.  All Participants in the study completed the "Regulations, Documentation and 
Drawing" course before participating.  This course (AMS 118) specifically includes privileges 
and limitations of FAR Parts 43, 65, and 91 pertinent to aircraft maintenance and the associated 
documents, publications, and records applicable to the AMT.  This requirement ensured that 
participants had enough knowledge in maintenance documentation to provide consistency when 
reading all related written materials associated with the task.  A brief assessment, administered 
during participant introduction, verified that participants understood the importance of 
Airworthiness Directives, what purpose workcards serve, as well as the effective use of a digital 
multi-meter and torque wrench.  All participants indicated a proficiency in reading and writing 
the English language.   
Materials 
Demographics form.  Participants completed a demographics form (see appendix A) that 
asked their gender, age, English proficiency, if they have completed the AMS 118 course or 
equivalent, which mechanic ratings they held, as well as their knowledge of torque wrenches, 
digital multi-meters, and basic hand tools. 
Consent form.  Participants completed and signed a written consent form to 
acknowledge their participation in the study (see appendix B).  The consent form described the 
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purpose of the study, the expected duration of participation, benefits and risks to the participant, 
confidentiality, and the voluntary nature of the study.   
Written documentation packet.  All participants received the same "written 
documentation packet" which included a work card, an airworthiness directive, and pertinent 
sections from a maintenance manual (see Appendix C).  The work card contained step-by-step 
instructions to complete the maintenance task.  Each step includes a space where the technician 
must place their initials after it is completed.  The airworthiness directive constituted a required 
inspection of a specific section of the alternator.  The FAA issues airworthiness directives when 
certain safety issues dictate a change in the performance of a part or inspection method.  AMTs 
must comply with airworthiness directives or face severe punishment.  The pertinent pages from 
the maintenance manual contain detailed step-by-step instructions on how to disassemble, 
inspect, repair, and reassemble the alternator.  The researcher designed these documents 
exclusively for this study. 
Tool pack.  Each participant received a standardized ―tool pack‖ that included the 
following tools: pencil and paper, standard size socket set with ratchet, inch-pound torque 
wrench, and digital multi-meter.  All participants completed a preliminary evaluation with the 
inch-pound torque wrench and digital multi meter before entering the study.  
 Work area.  Participants completed the maintenance task in an isolated room.  The room 
contained enough space for the participant to efficiently work on the alternator, as well as 
provided a suitable environment for a shift turnover to occur.     
Experimental task.  The maintenance task consisted of a Delco-Remy Model K5 
alternator.  The researcher disassembled, cleaned, inspected, and reassembled the alternator prior 
to use in the experiment.  Because there was no available written maintenance manual for this 
particular alternator, the researcher developed a unique set of maintenance manual pages based 
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on other models of alternators. For convenience, the researcher removed the springs that retained 
pressure for each brush from the alternator.  At the beginning of each participant trial, the 
researcher disassembled the alternator to a predetermined state to simulate the work performed 
by the previous shift.  To complete the maintenance task, the participant inspected and 
reassembled the alternator.  The common parts of a typical alternator are presented in figure 2 to 
aid the reader. 
 
Figure 2.  Common parts of a typical alternator. 
Trigger event errors.  The experimental task included three trigger events for 
participants to capture and correct.  The trigger events represented common occurrences in 
aviation incidents and accidents that involved shift turnovers, as depicted in the literature (see 
Parke and Kanki, 2008).   
Documentation event.  The maintenance documentation purposely did not include the 
importance of the alignment marks between the case and body of the alternator.  Instead, the step 
on the workcard only read, ―Install case onto body*‖.  The asterisk pointed to important 
information that would normally be located on the corresponding step in the maintenance 
manual.  However, the maintenance manual pages provided no mention of the case alignment.  
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The case and the body pieces make up the frame of the alternator and alignment of these 
components is necessary for proper alternator operation.  The researcher placed a mark on both 
the case and body, approximately ¼ inches long for alignment purposes.  For participants in the 
face-to-face condition, the previous shift actor mentioned the lack of notation of the alignment 
marks in the maintenance manual. However, for those participants in the written condition, only 
good judgment provided the means to capture the alignment marks.  A successful error capture 
occurred when the participant correctly aligned the case and body.  
Existing installation event.  An incorrectly installed part (diode) by the researcher 
simulated an installation error performed by the previous shift.  A diagram provided a visual 
reference of the correctly installed diode.  A successful error capture occurred when participants 
correctly identified the incorrectly installed diode and either voiced concerned to the manager or 
corrected the error and documented it on the workcard.   
Procedural event.  An airworthiness directive (AD) described a change to the torque 
value of the four case bolts (from 25 to 28-inch pounds), simulating a change in procedure.  A 
successful error capture occurred when the participant complied with the AD by applying the 
correct torque to the case bolts and most importantly, documenting compliance of the AD on the 
workcard. 
Design 
This study followed a 2 x 2 between subjects, fully factorial design.  The first 
independent variable was time pressure and had two levels.  In the first level, time pressure was 
present, where participants completed a maintenance task within a time limit (20 minutes).  In 
the second level, time pressure was absent, which allowed participants to complete the task 
without any intervention, unless they exceeded a 35-minute time constraint for study purposes.  
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 The second independent variable was shift turnover strategy and had two levels.  In the 
first level, written documentation was the primary means of information transfer.  In the second 
level, both written and face-to-face communication was exchanged.   
Independent variables 
 Written.  The purpose of the written level of the independent variable was to simulate a 
shift turnover that only involved written literature left behind from the previous shift technician, 
which is the standard practice in aviation maintenance organizations.  It was comprised of select 
maintenance manual pages, a workcard, and an airworthiness directive, all of which make up the 
―written documentation packet‖ (see Appendix C).  The workcard was designed to be used as a 
step-by-step reference; however, a truly accurate understanding of the experimental task is 
achieved when the workcard was used in conjunction with the maintenance manual pages and 
the airworthiness directive.  Participants solely relied on the information contained in the 
―written documentation packet‖ to complete the experimental task.  
 Face-to-face.  The purpose of this level of the independent variable was to simulate a 
shift turnover that involved a face-to-face briefing with the previous shift technician.  It served as 
a means for adding redundancy to the maintenance literature, while providing an opportunity for 
the participant to develop a complete understanding of the overall task.  Particulars discussed 
included, what steps of the task the previous shift technician had completed and which step to 
complete next, any abnormalities in the maintenance literature.  Additionally, the briefing 
provided the participant with an opportunity to ask questions about the task.  To provide a 
consistent briefing, the shift change actor, following a script, described the overall task as well 
as, what, why, and how they performed each step.  The actor also specifically mentioned three 
trigger events in a manner that encouraged the participant to investigate the errors.  The 
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participants in this condition also received all of the written information that the "written" group 
received.   
 Time pressure.  The purpose of this independent variable was to simulate a situation 
where completion of the experimental task required a short time frame.  In commercial aviation 
organizations, a constant pressure to retain aircraft in a ―flight ready‖ status is prevalent.  This 
time pressure may adversely affect the AMT, causing slips in maintenance tasks.  Participants 
were subjected either to time pressure (20 minutes) or to no time pressure.  In the time pressure 
conditions, the manager actor, following a script, reminded participants of the due back time 
periodically as they completed the experimental task (i.e., 15, 10, 5, and 2 minutes remaining).  
Participants exceeding the 35-minute study time constraint were stopped and evaluated by the 
researcher in a manner to which the participant would explain any remaining steps to be 
completed. 
Dependent variables 
 Three distinct variables measured participant performance: task completion time, number 
of skill-based errors, and number of three trigger events errors.  The manager actor used a 
stopwatch to measure total time of task completion.  This period started once the participant 
began working on the task and then stopped when they reported to the manager.  The researcher 
evaluated the number of skill-based errors using a task evaluation sheet (see Appendix D).  Skill-
based errors occurred when the participant did not read and/or not adhere to the maintenance 
manual (e.g., assembling alternator parts incorrectly).  The researcher measured three distinct 
trigger events using the task evaluation sheet.  An airworthiness directive simulated a trigger 
event that represented a change in task procedure; a missing reference in the maintenance manual 
simulated a trigger event that represented a documentation error; and finally, an incorrectly 
installed part simulated a trigger event that represented a previous technician installation error.  
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Table 2 provides a brief description of each task, the possible number of errors, the type of error 
associated, and measurement procedure.  Evaluation of errors took place after the participant left 
the experiment.        
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Table 2 
List of tasks and type of measurement used for each task.  
                      
Task   
Number of Possible 
Errors   Evaluation 
  
Skill-Based Trigger Event 
 
           
           Check position of 
diode    
1 
 
Did participant recognize previous 
shift installation error and place diode 
in correct position?  Yes or No?      
       
       Install stator onto 
body [30 inch/lbs]  
3 
   
Did participant check the torque value 
of three nuts @ 30 inch/lbs?  Torque 
value of nuts within ± 1 inch/lb?      
       
       Assemble case to 
body    
1 
 
Did participant align the case and 
body correctly, using the alignment 
marks?  Yes or No?      
       
           Secure case to 
body [35 inch/lbs]  
4 
 
1 
 
Did participant check the torque value 
of four bolts @ 35 inch/lbs (per AD-
37748)?  Torque value of bolts within 
± 1 inch/lb? 
     
       
           Attach fan and 
spacer to shaft   
2 
   
Did participant install the spacer and 
fan correctly?  Yes or No? 
     
       
Attach pulley, 
lock washer, and 
nut to shaft 
 
3 
   
Did participant install the parts in the 
correct order?  Yes or No? 
     
            Total Errors   12   3   
 
 Manipulation check.  Participants completed a reaction survey that presented statements 
about their perception of the shift turnover effectiveness, their perception of time pressure, and 
their thought of crosschecking a previous shift technicians work (see Appendix E).  Participants 
rated the statements using a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., 1- strongly agree, 5-strongly disagree).   
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Procedure 
 Experimental task setup.  Before the beginning of each run of a participant, the 
experimenter used a checklist to ensure the proper set up of the alternator.  The researcher setup 
the participant briefing area, which included a consent form, a demographics form, a 
maintenance survey, a task evaluation sheet, and the participant introduction script. The 
researcher briefed the manager and shift turnover actor on the conditions of the day, and 
provided the appropriate scripts.  The researcher placed the alternator and the tools in the work 
area in a disassembled state.  Specifically, the disassembled alternator replicated the previous 
shifts completion of steps 1-7 on the workcard.  Figure 3 provides a photographic representation 
of the work area as presented to participants.  
 
Figure 3.  Layout of alternator and tools on work area. 
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Participant Briefing.  Participants received one of four conditions: written with time 
pressure, face-to-face, written, or face-to-face with time pressure.  Each participant read and 
signed a consent form.  The researcher answered any questions about the consent form before 
proceeding.  Participants then filled out a demographics form. Following the introduction script, 
the researcher briefed participants about the study dependent on the condition assigned to them 
(see Participant Introduction, Appendix F).  After the briefing concluded, participants met the 
manger, who assigned them to a condition.  The manager then read a script pertaining to the 
condition.  The four conditions follow. 
Written with time pressure.  Participants in this condition received no verbal 
communication from the outgoing shift.  Instead, they received a task assignment and the written 
documentation packet from the manager.  The manager instructed participants to complete the 
task in 20 minutes.  The manager provided no support to participants once he left the work area 
and returned to the manager‘s desk.  The condition simulated a busy working environment, as 
the particular task used in this study required no additional help from others once the participant 
began the task.  The manager started a stopwatch as he left to return to the manager‘s desk.  The 
manager walked back to the work area and reminded the participant of the due back time at four 
separate intervals: 15, 10, 5, and 2 minutes remaining, respectively, with an increase in 
demanding vocal tone for each reminder (see Managers Script, Appendix F).  The manager 
stopped the stopwatch when participants indicated a completion of the task.  The manager 
documented total time of task completion for each participant.  The manger actor received 
training on projecting himself as a managerial figure.   
Face-to-face with time pressure.  Participants in this condition received instructions 
from the manager to relieve an outgoing shift (shift turnover actor) from the task.  The shift 
turnover actor provided participants with the written documentation packet, and a thorough 
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briefing of the task.  Additionally, the shift turnover actor provided answers to any questions 
posed by participants about the task (see Shift Turnover Actors Script, Appendix F).  Once the 
briefing concluded, the actor notified participants of a due back time of 20 minutes.  The 
manager started a stopwatch when the shift turnover actor returned to the manager‘s desk.  The 
manager reminded participants of the due back time at four separate intervals: 15, 10, 5, and 2 
minutes remaining, respectively, with an increase in demanding vocal tone for each reminder.  
The manager provided no support to participants. 
The shift turnover actor served as a subject matter expert in aviation maintenance and 
shift briefings.  The actor received training on how to communicate aspects related to the task 
assertively and accurately.  The shift turnover actor‘s script followed the ―checklist for effective 
shift handovers‖, developed by Parke and Mishkin (2005) from shift change literature.  The 
checklist reveals a method of efficient and thorough communication that should occur during a 
shift turnover.  The checklist ensured that participants received an efficient and thorough shift 
turnover.  
Written.  Participants in this condition received no verbal communication from the 
outgoing shift.  Instead, the manager gave participants the written documentation packet, and 
then instructed them to complete the task.  The manager provided no support to participants.  
Face-to-face.  Participants in this condition received instructions from the manager to 
relieve an outgoing shift (shift turnover actor) from the task.  The shift turnover actor provided 
participants with the written documentation packet, and a thorough briefing of the task.  
Additionally, the shift turnover actor provided answers to any questions posed by participants 
about the task.  The manager provided no support to participants. 
 Once finished with the task, the manager guided participants to the researcher‘s desk.  
Each participant filled out a reaction survey.  The researcher provided a debriefing (see appendix 
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G) and dismissed participants from the area.  Table 3 represents a structural breakdown of the 
procedure. 
Table 3 
Average times of each phase of study for time pressure conditions in minutes. 
      
Condition 
Phase           Written Face-to-Face 
Participant introduction        5 5 
Participant reads and signs out consent form  
 
3 3 
Participant fills out Demographics form 
  
1 1 
Participant receives shift turnover 
  
5 15 
Participant completes maintenance task  
  
25 22 
Participant fills out survey  
   
3 3 
Participant receives debriefing and leaves  
  
3 3 
Researcher inspects alternator for errors  
  
12 12 
Researcher ―resets‖ alternator for next participant    2 2 
    
Total Duration  56 66 
Note: Participants in conditions without time pressure were allocated an additional 15 minutes to 
complete the maintenance task. 
Data collection 
Error check.  The researcher inspected the assembled alternator following the ―Task 
Evaluation Sheet‖.  This sheet describes what errors the researcher must look for in the 
inspection.  The researcher documented the total number of skill-based errors and trigger event 
errors.  
Task Completion Time.  The manager actor documented total task duration using a 
stopwatch.  Task time began when either the manager or shift turnover actor assigned the 
participant the task.  Task time ended when the participant indicated they were finished with the 
task.  
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Results 
 The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of shift turnover strategy (face-to-
face or written) and time pressure on error capture, accuracy, and completion time of a 
maintenance task that was shared between two shifts.  It was hypothesized that AMTs subjected 
to a written shift turnover strategy would make more errors and would require more time to 
complete a maintenance task than AMTs who received a face-to-face shift turnover strategy.  
Additionally, it was hypothesized that AMTs under time pressure would make more errors than 
AMTs not under time pressure.  Finally, it was hypothesized that the type of shift turnover 
strategy would moderate the effect of time pressure on performance, such that; AMTs who 
received a face-to-face shift turnover strategy would be less impacted by time pressure than 
AMTs who received a written shift turnover strategy.  
 Results from three dependent measures evaluated AMT performance.  The first 
dependent measure examined the number of skill-based errors made on the maintenance task, 
such as incorrect torque values for bolts or incorrect placement of parts.  The second dependent 
measure examined the AMTs ability to recognize three trigger events, specifically, compliance 
with an airworthiness directive, alignment marks on the alternator, and an incorrectly installed 
part by the previous shift
3
.  The third dependent measure examined the amount of time 
participants needed to complete the maintenance task.  Finally, for verification of manipulation 
strength, a reaction survey provided perceptions of the shift turnover strategy and time pressure.  
Table 4 lists inter-item correlations for all dependent measures and reaction survey composite 
variables. 
 
 
                                                          
3
 This trigger event provided little variability, as the majority of participants did not recognize the 
installation error, thereby warranting exclusion from analysis 
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Table 4 
Correlations for Dependent Measures and Reaction Survey Composite Variables  
Dependent Measure 
Trigger Event 
Errors 
Skill Based 
Errors 
Task 
Completion 
Time 
(minutes) 
Shift 
Turnover 
Perception 
Time 
Pressure 
Perception 
Trigger Event Errors 1 
    
Skill Based Errors .011 1 
   
Task Completion 
Time (minutes) 
.068 .166 1 
  
Shift Turnover 
Perception -0.072 -0.055 -0.314* 1  
Time Pressure 
Perception 0.266 -0.291 -0.267 0.106 1 
* Denotes significance at the .05 level (two-tailed) 
To accommodate the two independent variables and three dependent measures, a two-
way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used for this study.  A Box‘s M test was 
not significant, F(18, 4579.73) = 1.23, p = .224, indicating the assumption of homogeneity of 
covariance was not violated.  The following sub-sections present the results based upon 
hypotheses.  
Main Effects 
  Shift turnover strategy.  Hypothesis 1 was comprised of two parts, the first of which 
concerned the effect of shift turnover strategy on error rate in a shared maintenance task (H1a) 
and the second of which concerned the effect of shift turnover strategy on task completion time 
(H1b).  The multivariate test showed a significant main effect for shift turnover strategy on 
performance, Hotelling‘s Trace, F(3, 34) = 4.49, p = .009, partial ή2 = .284, observed power = 
.840.  According to partial eta
2
, shift turnover strategy accounted for 28 % of variance in the 
combined dependent variables.  Univariate tests provided the specific effect of shift turnover 
strategy on each dependent measure (see Table 5).   
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Table 5 
Univariate F-test results for effect of shift turnover strategy on dependent measures. 
Dependent Measure     F p Partial ή2  Power 
                
Trigger Event Errors 
  
9.28 .004 .205 .843 
        Skill-based Errors 
  
2.92 .096 .075 .383 
        Task Completion Time   2.27 .141 .059 .311 
 
 Specifically, AMTs who received a written turnover strategy made significantly more 
trigger event errors (M = 1.4, SD = 0.82) than AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover 
strategy (M = 0.70, SD = 0.66), as the univariate test revealed, F(1, 36) = 9.28; p = .004, partial 
ή2 = .205, observed power = .843.  Shift turnover strategy accounted for 20.5% of the variance in 
trigger event errors.  AMTs who received a written turnover strategy made more skill-based 
errors (M = 1.10, SD = 1.17) than AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover strategy (M = 
0.55, SD = 0.83), however, this difference was not statistically significant with the univariate 
test, F(1, 36) = 2.92; p = .096, partial ή2 = .075, observed power = .383.  These results partially 
support hypothesis H1a, in that AMTs who received a written turnover made more trigger event 
errors than AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover, but no significant difference appeared 
between the groups on skill-based errors.    
 With respect to task completion time (H1b), AMTs who received a written turnover 
required more time to complete the maintenance task (M = 24.76 minutes, SD = 8.49) than 
AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover (M = 21.38 minutes, SD = 7.18).  However, the 
univariate test found these means did not differ significantly, F(1, 36) = 2.27; p = .141, partial ή2 
= .059, observed power = .31.  These results do not support hypothesis H1b, which stated that 
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AMTs subjected to a written shift turnover would take longer to perform a maintenance task than 
AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover.    
 Time pressure.  Hypothesis 2 predicted an effect of time pressure on error rate.  The 
multivariate test showed a significant main effect for the presence of time pressure, Hotelling‘s 
Trace, F(3, 34) = 4.99, p = .006, partial ή2 = .306, observed power = .880.  Next, univariate tests 
provided the specific effect of time pressure on each dependent measure (see Table 6).   
Table 6 
Univariate F-test results for effect of time pressure on the dependent measures. 
Dependent Measure     F p Partial ή2  Power 
                
Trigger Event Errors 
  
3.03 .090 .078 .396 
        Skill-based Errors 
  
1.18 .284 .032 .185 
        Task Completion Time   10.48 .003 .225 .883 
 
 Although AMTs who were subjected to time pressure made less skill-based errors (M = 
0.65, SD = 0.93) than AMTs not under time pressure (M = 1.00, SD = 1.12), the univariate test 
indicated that these means did not differ significantly, F(1, 36) = 1.18; p = .284, partial ή2 = .032, 
observed power = .185.  Similarly, while AMTs subjected to time pressure made more trigger 
event errors (M = 1.25, SD = 0.85) than AMTs not under time pressure (M = 0.85, SD = .75), the 
subsequent univariate test indicated that time pressure did not have a significant effect on trigger 
event errors, F(1, 36) = 3.03; p = .090, partial ή2 = .078, observed power = .396.  In contrast, 
AMTs under time pressure completed the maintenance task significantly faster (M = 19.44 
minutes, SD = 6.23) than AMTs not under time pressure (M = 26.70 minutes, SD = 7.94), F(1, 
36) = 10.48; p = .003, partial ή2 = .225, observed power = .883.  Thus, time pressure accounted 
for 22.5% of the variance in task completion time.  These results do not support the hypothesis 
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that AMTs subjected to time pressure would make more errors than AMTs who were given 
ample time to complete a maintenance task.  
Interaction Effect 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that turnover strategy would moderate the effect of time pressure 
on performance.  The multivariate test showed no significant interaction effect, Wilks‘ Lambda, 
F(3, 34) = .465, p = .709, partial ή2 = .039, observed power = .134.  While, AMTs who received 
a face-to-face turnover performed better across all dependent measures than AMTs who received 
a written turnover (see table 7), no comparisons yielded a significant difference between groups.  
Therefore, the hypothesis that AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover would be less 
impacted by time pressure than AMTs who received a written shift turnover was not statistically 
supported.  Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the skill-based errors, trigger event errors, and task 
completion time for all study conditions. 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations of Interactions by Dependent Measures. 
Dependent 
Measure  
Turnover 
Strategy 
Time Pressure 
Condition     M SD 
      
Skill-based Errors Written 
Present 1.00 1.15 
Absent 1.20 1.23 
   
   
  Face-to-face 
Present 0.30 0.48 
  
Absent 0.80 1.03 
      Trigger Event 
Errors 
Written 
Present 1.70 0.67 
Absent 1.10 0.88 
   
   
  Face-to-face 
Present 0.80 0.79 
  
Absent 0.60 0.52 
      Task Completion 
Time 
Written 
Present 20.58 7.40 
Absent 28.95 7.65 
   
   
  Face-to-face 
Present 18.31 4.93 
    Absent 24.46 7.98 
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Figure 4.  Mean Skill-based Errors by Shift Turnover Strategy and Time Pressure. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Mean Trigger Event Errors by Shift Turnover Strategy and Time Pressure. 
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Figure 6.  Mean Task Completion Time by Shift Turnover Strategy and Time Pressure. 
Reaction Survey 
The reaction survey included ten statements.  Four statements measured the perception of 
effectiveness of the shift turnover, four statements measured the perception of time pressure 
during the task, and one statement measured the perception of trust of in the previous shift.  
Participants rated their agreement of the statements using a 5-point scale (1 – strongly disagree, 2 
– disagree, 3 – neutral, 4 – agree, 5 – strongly agree).  All participants completed the survey 
immediately after finishing the maintenance task.  A Pearson‘s product-moment correlation 
coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the statements.  Table 8 lists all 
statements and their respective correlations.  
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Table 8 
Summary of Inter-item Correlations for Reaction Survey Statements  
Statement 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 1          
2 .590
**
 1         
3 .703
**
 .399
*
 1        
4 -.019 -.189 -.019 1       
5 .805
**
 .591
**
 .593
**
 -.040 1      
6 .356
*
 .652
**
 .213 -.245 .340
*
 1     
7 .347
*
 .228 .252 .051 .378
*
 -.089 1    
8 -.337
*
 -.309 -.317
*
 .396
*
 -.388
*
 -.195 -.160 1   
9 .095 .142 .098 .289 -.005 .251 -.056 -.081 1  
10 -.013 -.061 -.151 .628
**
 -.152 -.055 -.078 .402
*
 .509
**
 1 
**. Denotes significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *.  Denotes significance at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). 
1. I had a good understanding of how to inspect and reassemble the alternator correctly. 
2. The previous shift technician provided a clear picture of what work had been done to the 
alternator. 
3. All information required to complete the task was in the documentation. 
4. I felt pressured to finish the alternator task quickly. 
5. I fully understood each and every step of the task. 
6. I am confident that the previous shift technician completed every step correctly. 
7. I always look-over someone else's work before I sign-off on a task. 
8. I had plenty of time to finish the alternator task. 
9. I was aware the alternator had a "due back time" and I tried to finish the task quickly. 
10. I was in a hurry to finish the alternator task. 
 
With respect to the effectiveness of the shift turnover, statements 1, 2, 5, and 6 fit well 
together (Cronbach‘s alpha = .83), which resulted in the formation of a composite variable that 
represented whether participants felt the shift turnover they received was effective in transferring 
information related to completion of the task.  With respect to the effectiveness of time pressure, 
statements 4, 8, and 10 fit well together (Cronbach‘s alpha = .73), which resulted in the 
formation of a composite variable that represented whether participants felt pressured to finish 
the task quickly.  Statements 3, 7, and 9 did not fit well with any other statements and were not 
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included in analysis.  Tables 9 and 10 summarize the means and standard deviations of shift 
turnover perception and perception of time pressure, respectively. 
Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Perception Shift Turnover Effectiveness 
    
Perception of Shift Turnover 
Effectiveness 
Turnover Strategy   M (SD)   
     Written 
  
3.14 (0.86) 
     Face-to-face   4.03 (0.82) 
 
Table 10 
Means and Standard Deviations for Perception of Time Pressure 
    Perception of Time Pressure 
Time Pressure condition   M (SD)   
     Present 
  
3.56 (0.56) 
 
     Absent     2.70 (0.58)   
 
An Independent samples t-test determined any significant difference in responses for both 
shift turnover and time pressure conditions.  When asked about shift turnover perception, those 
who received a written shift turnover felt the turnover was significantly less effective (M = 3.14, 
SD = .86) than those who received a face-to-face shift turnover (M = 4.03, SD = .82), t(38) = -
3.34, p < .05.  When asked if participants felt the need to complete the task quickly, those who 
were under time pressure felt significantly more pressured to complete the task quickly (M = 
3.56, SD = .56) than those who received no time pressure (M = 2.7, SD = .58), t(38) = 4.82, p < 
.05.   
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Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to determine if shift turnover strategy and time pressure 
affect AMT performance on a maintenance task shared between shifts.  Many issues affect 
AMTs, however, situations that combine both time pressure and communication between shift 
technicians may have led to accidents such as Alaska Airlines Flight 261.  Though past research 
has proposed a possible relationship between shift turnover strategy and errors (Maddox, 1998; 
Miles, 1998; Parke & Kanki, 2008, etc.), the majority of available data is based on self-reported 
incidents.  Research does indicate that people under time pressure are more likely to make more 
errors when performing a task then people given ample time (Lin & Su, 1998; Chu & Spires, 
2001).  Some results from the current study provide empirical support to the argument for the 
need of face-to-face shift turnovers in aviation maintenance, especially when different shifts 
share a maintenance task.  The following sections provide interpretation of the results. 
Effect of Shift Turnover Strategy 
 To examine an effect of shift turnover strategy, the current study used two shift turnover 
strategies.  The first, a written shift turnover strategy, simulated a situation where the outgoing 
shift technician generated a shift turnover report (work card) for the incoming shift technician to 
complete an unfinished maintenance task.  The second, a face-to-face shift turnover strategy, 
simulated a situation where the outgoing shift technician verbally briefed the incoming shift 
technician about an unfinished maintenance task.  In the current study, AMTs given the written 
shift turnover strategy made significantly more trigger event errors than AMTs given the face-to-
face shift turnover strategy.  These results were expected, as during the face-to-face turnover, the 
outgoing shift informed AMTs about the airworthiness directive and case alignment marks 
(trigger events) during the verbal briefing.  In contrast, the written documentation packet 
provided no information about the alignment marks, but included the airworthiness directive.  
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AMTs who received a written turnover strategy had to recognize both trigger events by their own 
investigation.  A great effort is made by publishers of maintenance literature to include any 
critical information (e.g. alignment marks) in documentation.  However, inconsistent quality and 
lack of standardization across publishers of maintenance literature is prevalent (see Chaparro, 
Groff, Chaparro, & Scarlet, 2002) and therefore this reality was replicated in this study by 
excluding any statement of the alignment marks.  These results indicate that how task specific 
knowledge is shared via, in this study, a face-to-face turnover, can make a significant difference 
in the interpretation and use of that knowledge.  The face-to-face strategy allowed the incoming 
technician to pose questions about the task, communicate concerns, gain perspective on the task, 
and acquire critical information that may have otherwise been assumed knowledge.  The results 
partially support the hypothesis that AMTs given a written turnover strategy would make more 
errors than AMTs given a face-to-face shift turnover strategy.   
Regarding skill-based errors, no significant difference existed between the two groups.  
The experimental task and the performance measures may be the reason why the predicted effect 
did not occur.  Specifically, the design of the maintenance task included 12 possible points to 
make skill-based errors.  These errors consisted of AMTs not applying the correct torque to bolts 
and AMTs not installing components of the alternator correctly.  Two limitations guided the 
selection of the 12 possible errors.  The first limitation was the length of the time to complete 
data collection.  The researcher designed the task to allow a completion time limit of 35 minutes 
for each participant.  This limitation allowed data collection to occur within a reasonable time 
frame for a thesis project.  Therefore, the researcher designed the task to exclude lengthy 
procedures found in actual aircraft maintenance, such as safety wiring.  In a real-world setting, 
maintenance tasks are much more complex and may require many hours to complete. 
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The second limitation was mechanical experience level of participants.  In order to recruit 
a sizable sample of participants for the current study, recruitment was targeted to students who 
had finished the General portion of AMT training.  These students met the requirement of 
completing a course on maintenance documentation and aviation law.  However, they were not 
required to have the knowledge and skill as a fully licensed aircraft mechanic.  Therefore, the 
researcher designed the maintenance task with just enough difficulty for a novice mechanic to 
understand.   
Ultimately, the simplification of the task resulted in a ceiling effect on scores.  AMTs in 
both turnover strategies made a low number of skill-based errors.  The means show a small 
improvement in performance for AMTs that received the face-to-face strategy compared to 
AMTs that received the written strategy.  Perhaps if a greater length of time was allocated to 
accommodate a more complex task, a significant difference in skill-based errors may have 
appeared between shift strategies.  Further research is recommended to determine if shift 
turnover strategy will have a significant effect on skill-based errors.   
It was hypothesized that AMTs given the written strategy would take longer to complete 
the task than AMTs given the face-to-face turnover strategy.  Shift turnover strategy had no 
significant effect on task completion time.  AMTs in both turnover strategies took about the same 
amount of time to complete the task.  This result may also be attributed to the simplicity of the 
task described previously.  Additionally, the manner in which the information was presented in 
the face-to-face turnover was intended to help the AMT gain a better understanding of the task.  
It is possible that too much information was communicated during the face-to-face turnover.  
Perhaps AMTs in the face-to-face turnover did not effectively retain the information the 
outgoing shift presented to them, which ultimately led to a comparative understanding that the 
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written turnover had of the task.  Once they begun the task, they may have forgotten a portion of 
the information presented in the briefing.  
Effect of time pressure 
 This study used two levels of time pressure.  The first level, time pressure present, 
essentially required AMTs to complete the maintenance task within an allocated amount of time, 
while being subjected to constant reminders of a ―due back time‖ by the manager (actor).  This 
condition simulated a maintenance task with a short deadline be returned to an aircraft awaiting 
departure.  The second level, time pressure absent, allowed AMTs ample amount of time to 
complete the task and no reminders from the ―manager‖.  It was hypothesized that AMTs under 
time pressure would make more errors than AMTs given an ample amount of time to complete 
the task; however, the results do not support the hypothesis.   
  Since increases in workload, which can be due to time pressure, is well known to impact 
human performance (Staal, 2004), it is likely the lack of effect in this study was due to the 
manipulation of time pressure.  That is, the manipulation of time pressure was not strong enough 
to put the participants in a high workload/high stress environment.  Interestingly, however, the 
participants in the high time pressure condition performed the task in significantly less time.  
Additionally, the reaction survey indicated that participants in the high time pressure condition 
felt significantly more time pressure than the participants in the low time pressure condition.  
Now consider the curvilinear relationship between workload and performance.  If a person is 
subjected to low workload, their performance tends to suffer.  A medium amount of workload 
tends to stimulate a person enough to achieve the best performance.  Finally, people subjected to 
high workload tend to become overwhelmed, and thus their performance degrades.  (see 
Hancock & Szalma, 2008).  AMTs in the no time pressure condition received very little 
stimulation and their performance was slightly worse (although not statistically different) than 
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those exposed to the high time pressure condition.  It may be that the high time pressure 
condition actually was just a moderate amount of stimulation given by the reminders by the 
manager.  However, the reminders were not strong enough to overload AMTs to a point where 
performance would begin to degrade.  Essentially, AMTs may have been pressured just enough 
to perform effectively.  Perhaps the method of reminders used in this study may not represent 
other forms of time pressure AMTs experience.  Possibly a situation where AMTs were actually 
working on an actual aircraft that was waiting for departure may provide a stronger 
representation of time pressure in future research.   
 Further refinement of the task and measures also may have enabled greater assessment of 
the effect of time pressure on performance.  Perhaps different types of skill-based errors and 
trigger events should be evaluated. 
Effect of time pressure and shift turnover strategy on performance  
 The results indicated no significant interaction between shift turnover strategy and time 
pressure.  This is attributed to the combination of a simple maintenance task and a weak 
manipulation of time pressure.  However, increasing the difficulty of the maintenance task and 
strengthening the manipulation of time pressure may result in a significant interaction. 
Future research 
 Environment.  The environment in which participants received briefings and completed 
the maintenance task simulated a small component repair station, where working in a quiet, 
climate-controlled environment is commonplace.  This environment was well suited to provide 
internal validity for this study.  However, as stated previously, the majority of aviation 
maintenance is performed in a hanger environment.  Factors such as lighting, temperature, noise, 
and distractions make up a typical hanger environment.  Therefore, a replication of this study in 
an active maintenance hangar may provide a more accurate assessment of AMT performance.  
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 AMT experience level.  The participants in this study were not certificated AMTs, but 
students in an AMT program that had completed enough training to understand  the importance 
of the written documentation packet, the regulations surrounding aviation maintenance, and most 
importantly, the rights and responsibilities of an AMT.  A third trigger event involved AMTs 
recognizing a mistake made by the outgoing shift.  Specifically, the diode of the alternator was 
incorrectly installed with the intent of AMTs discovering and correcting the error.  
Unfortunately, the majority of AMTs missed this error (77%) and subsequently, this trigger 
event was removed from all analysis.  It is possible that the average experience level with 
alternators was not high enough for AMTs to recognize the incorrectly installed part, even 
though the maintenance manual indicated all applicable parts to for the task and inspection of the 
diode was a required step that was already completed by the outgoing shift.  This trigger event 
was removed from analysis. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the current study partially supports the argument to require face-to-face 
shift turnover strategies in aviation maintenance.  Conceivably, use of the face-to-face strategy 
helped increase AMTs understanding of the task.  The outgoing shift actor explained how he 
completed each step of the task and indicated which step was next.  Additionally, the outgoing 
shift actor was available to answer any questions AMTs had about the task.  The results of the 
reaction survey substantiate this notion as AMTs in the face-to-face strategy perceived the shift 
turnover as helpful and effective.  Additionally, a level of inter-shift trust may have increased 
confidence levels for AMTs in the face-to-face strategy, which has been shown to be trait of 
AMTs (Taylor & Thomas, 2003). 
Written shift turnover reports may be difficult to interpret, poorly written and may not 
contain critical information, such as procedural changes.  The latter is based on assumptions by 
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the outgoing technician that the incoming technician would already know any procedurals 
changes.  Therefore, the common practice of the outgoing shift generating and distributing 
written shift turnover reports to the incoming shift, without any verbal briefing may not provide 
the most effective means of information transfer.   
 Additional research on this topic is needed to identify which types of errors are mitigated 
by the use of face-to-face turnover strategies.  Researchers should make the following 
considerations when designing an aviation maintenance shift turnover study: a) the difficulty of 
the maintenance task should reflect the experience level of AMTs performing the task, b) if 
possible, published maintenance literature specific to the task should be used, c) a suitable 
amount of trigger event errors should be assigned to the maintenance task, d) the task should 
allow the possibility of skill based errors to occur, e) the shift turnover should consider all the 
best practices supported by the literature (Maddox, 1998; Miles, 1998; Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2005; Parke & Kanki, 2008). 
 An ideal study would take place in an active maintenance hangar that practices the 
written turnover strategy; perhaps with a task that is commonly performed by the AMTs who 
work there, so that the additional effect of complacency can be measured.       
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Appendix A 
Demographics Form 
Please answer the following questions honestly and accurately.  
What is your gender?        Male or Female 
What is your age?         _______ 
Are you proficient in reading and           
writing the English language?     Yes or No 
Have you completed the ―Regulations, Documentation,               
and Drawing‖ course (AMS 111) or equivalent?     Yes or No 
Do you currently hold any FAA mechanic ratings       
  (A, P or A&P)?        Yes or No 
 If ―yes‖, list all ratings _________________________________ 
Are you able to determine ―continuity‖ using a digital multi-meter? Yes or No 
Are you able to use an inch/lb torque wrench?    Yes or No 
Are you able to use basic hand tools?      Yes or No 
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Appendix B 
Participant Information 
Measurement of task completion after shift change 
Conducted by William R. Warren 
Advisor: Dr. Elizabeth Blickensderfer 
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 
600 S. Clyde Morris Blvd. 
Daytona Beach, FL 32114 
 
Purpose of Research 
This study will measure your ability to complete an unfinished maintenance task.  The researcher 
will provide all related material to complete the task.  
 
Duration of Participation 
A total commitment of 2 hours is required for participation. 
 
Benefits to the Individual 
Participants who complete the task will receive an entry ticket into a drawing for a $300 gift card 
for tools.  The ticket shall contain your name and choice of contact information (phone number 
or email).  The winner will have the choice of a gift card valued at $300 from one of the 
following tool retailers: Snap-on ™, Matco ™, or Craftsman ™.  A single ticket will be drawn 
from a box in the presence of the researcher‘s committee at the conclusion of the study.  The 
winner will be notified via phone and email. 
 
Risks to the Individual 
There are no known risks associated with this study.  Safety glasses will be available for use, but 
are not required.  
 
Confidentiality 
Participation in this study is anonymous.  You will be assigned a number, and only that number 
will be used while recording and reporting data.  All data will be kept in a locked file cabinet in 
the Department of Human Factors and Systems at Embry-Riddle.   
 
Voluntary Nature of Participation 
I acknowledge that my participation in this research is voluntary and that I may stop participating 
at any time.  I understand that withdrawal from the study negates entry into the tool prize.  I have 
been informed of the general scientific purposes of this study.  You may request a copy of this 
consent form, as well as, a copy of the results of this research by contacting William R. Warren 
(warre88c@erau.edu) or Dr. Elizabeth Blickensderfer (elizabeth.blickensderfer@erau.edu). 
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Statement of Consent 
 
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 
 
I consent to participating in the research project entitled:  Measurement of Task Completion 
after Shift Change. 
Researcher: William R. Warren 
 
The individual above has explained the purpose of the study, the procedures to be followed, and 
the expected duration of my participation.  I have read the page labeled ―Participant Information‖ 
and agree to the conditions of the study.  Possible benefits of the study have been described, as 
have alternate procedures, if such procedures are applicable and available. 
I certify that I have met the following requirements: 
o Completed the ―Regulations, Documentation, and Drawing‖ course (AMS 111) or 
posses an Airframe or Powerplant Certification or combination (A&P). 
o Have knowledge of basic hand tool use (including torque wrench and digital 
multi-meter) 
o Ability to read and write the English language 
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding the 
study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction.  
Furthermore, I understand that I am free to withdraw consent at any time and to discontinue 
participation in the study without prejudice to me.  I understand that withdrawal from the study 
negates entry into the tool prize. 
Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form.  I sign it freely 
and voluntarily. 
______________ 
Date 
_________________________________________ 
Participant‘s Name (please print)       
_________________________________________    
Participant‘s Signature       
_________________________________________     
Researcher Signature 
_____Yes, I would like to be contacted regarding the results of the study. 
_____Yes, I would like to be entered into the tool drawing (phone number & email required). 
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Appendix C  
Written Documentation Packet  
Maintenance Manuel Pages 
Vent Ace Model 100-F      Service Manual Rev. 3 
 
Delco-Remy Model K5 Alternator Repair  
Disassembly 
1-Remove Pulley.  Place a number 8 Allen wrench in center of 
the shaft and loosen nut with a 15/16 wrench. 
2-Remove fan and two spacers.  *Note placement of spacers 
and fan. 
3-Remove four case screws using a 5/16 deep well socket, 
loosen the four case bolts.  Retain washers with bolts.   
4-Separate case from body.  Carefully slide case off center 
shaft. 
5-Remove rotor from body.  Grasp center shaft and carefully 
pull out rotor from body 
6- Remove stator from body.  Remove the two nuts, and lift 
the stator from the body.   
Diode Inspection 
Note: The internal components of this alternator are 
delicate.  Handle with care.  
7- Remove Diode.  Remove the two bolts and lift the 
diode out of the body.  *Note position of diode in 
diagram.   
Check for continuity between the two terminals of the 
diode.   
 If no continuity, diode is ok.   
 Install diode.  Hand tighten the nuts using 1/4 socket. 
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Transducer Inspection 
8-Test for no continuity between Body and terminals 1, 2, and 3.  Connect an ohmmeter between 
terminal 1 and body.  There should be no continuity.  Repeat test for terminal 2 and 3, using 
body as ground.  If continuity is present, replace transducer.  
*See diagram 
 
Reassembly 
9- Install stator onto body.  Connect wires to the three posts.  
Stator should fit snugly into body.  Note: Hand tighten the 
nuts using 11/32 socket.  
10- Install rotor into body.  Grasp center shaft and carefully place rotor into body.  Ensure center 
shaft is fully engaged in main bearing.  Looseness of rotor is 
normal. 
11- Assemble case to body.  Line up shaft bearing and slide 
case onto body. 
   
12- Secure case to body.  Insert bolts into body.  Note: Hand-
tighten the bolts first, then torque the bolts to 25 inch/lbs.  
13- Attach fan and spacers to shaft.  Slide on spacers and 
then fan onto shaft.  *See diagram 
14- Attach pulley to shaft.  Place pulley onto shaft.  Install 
lock washer and nut.  *Hand tighten nut only (final 
tightening torque is applied during installation on 
engine).  
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Work Card 
 
Note: Steps 1-7 on the workcard participant‘s received contained initials by the previous shift. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Delco-Remy Model K5 Alternator Repair 
Work Card #812F
Each  s tep must be ini tia led when complete.
Disassembly
1-Remove Pulley 
2-Remove fan and two spacers* 
3-Remove four case bolts* 
4-Separate case from body 
5-Remove rotor from body 
6- Remove stator from body
7- Inspect Diode
Inspection
Reassembly
9- Install stator onto body 
10-Place rotor into body 
11-Assemble case to body* 
12-Secure case to body*[25 inch/lbs] 
13-Attach fan and spacers to shaft 
14-Attach pulley to shaft*
I______________certify this task as complete.
SUNCO AVIATION ™
8-Test for no continuity between             
body and terminals 1, 2, and 3*
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Airworthiness Directive 
 
 
Airworthiness Directive 
Effective Date 1-15-2011 
AD-37748  
 
Purpose 
A manufacturer discrepancy has been filed with the Division of Airworthiness Standards office 
regarding a change in repair procedures for the Vent Ace Model 100-F Airframe.  This aircraft 
utilizes two different alternator models: Delco-Remy Model 15-D and Delco-Remy Model K5.  
This airworthiness directive applies to all alternators labeled ―Delco-Remy Model K5‖.  If 
encountered, all aircraft with a ―Delco-Remy Model K5‖ alternator installed shall be grounded 
until the ―required action‖ is performed.  Failing to comply with this directive will produce an 
unairworthy condition and legal action will be taken.  
Required action 
The manufacturer (Delco-Remy) has changed the torque value for the four bolts that join the 
case to the body of the alternator to 28 inch/lbs. 
Required documentation 
Notice of completion must be indicated on all workcards.  Place the following information next 
to the technicians initials for the installation step:  ―AD-37748 Complied‖ 
 
 
 U.S. Department of Transportation 
             Washington, DC  AD-37748 
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Appendix D 
Task Evaluation Sheet 
Experimenter shall determine participants met the following conditions, after participant 
completes the task and leaves the lab.  An X indicates error has been made.  All torque 
values must be ± 1 inch/lbs 
  
  
  
       
        
Position correct? 
Check if the Center Nut, Lock Washer, and Pulley are positioned correctly. 
 
Center Nut Lock Washer 
        
Pulley 
 
Check if fan and spacer are positioned correctly. 
   
Position correct? 
 
Is the fan installed before the spacer? 
   
fan  
 
 
Remove fan and spacer. 
    
spacer 
 
          Check torque value of case bolts [28 inch/lbs] 
   
4 Torque Values 
 
Is each case bolt at correct torque value per airworthiness directive? bolt 1 bolt 3 
 
Remove case bolts. 
     
bolt 2 bolt 4 
        
AD complied with? 
        
  
 
          Check if case and body are aligned correctly by locating alignment marks.   
 
Case Aligned? 
 
Do both marks match? 
    
  
 
 
Remove case from body. 
      
 
Remove rotor from body. 
      
          Check torque value at stator nuts [Hand tight] 
   
3 torque values 
 
Are stator nuts at correct torque value? 
   
nut 1 nut 3 
 
Remove stator. 
     
nut 2 
 
          Check position of diode (refer to figure below) 
   Diode position 
correct? 
Is diode in correct position according to figure 
below? 
  
        
  
 
          
          Remove diode and place in the INCORRECT position for experiment reset. 
   
     
Total Errors_______   Percent 
Correct_______ 
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Appendix E 
Please answer the following questions honestly and accurately.  Your responses will remain 
completely anonymous. 
All questions are answered with a 5-point scale. 

1 - strongly disagree,  2 – disagree,  3 – unsure, 4 - agree,  5 - strongly agree 
 
1. I had a good understanding of how to inspect and reassemble the alternator correctly. 
2. The previous shift technician provided a clear picture of what work had been done to the 
alternator. 
3. All information required to complete the task was in the documentation. 
4. I felt pressured to finish the alternator task quickly. 
5. I fully understood each and every step of the task. 
6. I am confident that the previous shift technician completed every step correctly. 
7. I always look-over someone else's work before I sign-off on a task. 
8. I had plenty of time to finish the alternator task. 
9. I was aware the alternator had a "due back time" and I tried to finish the task quickly. 
10. I was in a hurry to finish the alternator task. 
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Appendix F 
Scripts 
Participant Briefing Script 
Researcher:  
1) Hello and welcome to the study.  Please read this consent form carefully and sign and date it.  
2) Please, fill out this demographics form. 
3) Do you have any questions regarding the consent or demographics form?   
4) Demonstrate the use of a clicker-type torque wrench to apply torque to a bolt. 
5) Demonstrate the use of a digital multi-meter to find continuity. 
6) Ask Participant the following questions: 
 Are you familiar with workcards?  
 A work card is an ordered number of steps, for instance 1-8, required to complete a task.  
AMT's use work cards when performing maintenance on aircraft and components.  You 
follow the steps and initial each step as complete once you finish it.  Each work card is 
tailored to the specific task it is used for.  AMT's are trained to follow procedures to 
ensure a job is performed correctly.  
  Are you familiar with airworthiness directives? 
Airworthiness directives (AD's) are legal documents, issued by the FAA, that require 
immediate attention.  AMT's are trained to comply with airworthiness directives.  They 
know that if they do not comply with AD's, the consequences could be severe.  
Noncompliance affects not only for the integrity of the technician, but hundreds of lives 
that fly in the aircraft. 
7) Let me describe what will be happening today.  You were just hired as an AMT at a major 
aircraft repair facility.  You work the evening shift and are just coming into your first day of 
work.  Today you will be asked to complete a maintenance task that a mechanic from the day 
shift did not finish. 
8) Randomly assign the participant to a condition.   
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Written With Time Pressure Manager Script 
Manager:  
Say the following in a mild tempered voice. 
1) Hi, welcome to work.  Let's get started! 
Walk participant over to workstation 
2) I need you to finish up Jim‘s work with that alternator; he left already for the day.   
3) He left all the tools out for you.  Here‘s the paperwork.  
 Hand Participant “written documentation packet” 
4) I need that alternator and workcard back in 20 minutes! Dispatch is already screaming at me!   
5) I've gotta get back to my desk; gotta a lot of work to do. 
6) Get it done quick and make sure it‘s done right!  
Return to manager desk. DO NOT RESPOND TO PARTICIPANT QUESTIONS.   
 Start timer when you return to manger desk.  
 Monitor the timer and follow the notification schedule below: 
At 5 minutes on the timer, Walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE 
"Ya doing alright with that?" 
At 10 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE   
"I need that alternator in 10 minutes" 
At 15 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE 
"Ya got 5 minutes to finish that alternator!" 
At 18 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
 "Hurry up with that alternator, dispatch is losing it!" 
Stop timer when participant returns the work card and alternator to the manager.  
Record total time. 
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Face-To-Face With Time Pressure Manager Script 
Manager: 
Say the following in a mild tempered voice. 
1) Hi, welcome to work.   
2) I need you to relieve Sam over there; her shift is ending soon. 
3) She‘s got everything ya need. 
Send participant to actor. 
Return to manager desk. DO NOT RESPOND TO PARTICIPANT QUESTIONS.   
Start timer when actor returns to manager desk. 
 Monitor the timer and follow the notification schedule below: 
At 5 minutes on the timer, Walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE 
"Ya doing alright with that?" 
At 10 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE   
"I need that alternator in 10 minutes" 
At 15 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE 
"Ya got 5 minutes to finish that alternator!" 
At 18 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
 "Hurry up with that alternator, dispatch is losing it!" 
Stop timer when participant returns the work card and alternator to the manager.  
Record total time. 
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Written Manager Script 
Manager: 
Say the following in a mild tempered voice. 
Hi, welcome to work.  
 I need you to finish up Jim‘s work with that alternator; he left already for the day.   
He left all the tools out for you.  Here‘s the paperwork.  
Hand Participant “written documentation packet” 
 
Face-To-Face Manager Script 
Manager: 
Say the following in a mild tempered voice. 
Hi, welcome to work.   
I need you to relieve Sam over there; her shift is ending soon. 
She‘s got everything ya need. 
Send participant to actor. 
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Shift Change Actor‘s Script  
 
1) "Hey, how‘s it going?  I‘m Sam.‖ 
2) "This alternator is due for inspection, so I started working on it.‖ 
3) "Let me show you what I have done so far."  
 
4) "Here is the workcard & maintenance manual pages I printed out.  Follow along while I 
describe each step I've done"  
• Give participant the maintenance manual pages & workcard. 
• Point to each part of alternator as you describe how you removed it.  
 
5) "I began by removing the center nut and lock washer" 
6) "Then I took the pulley off" 
7) "Then I removed the fan" 
8) "And next came the spacer" 
9)  "You got all that?"   
• If yes, continue describing steps.  
• If no, make sure participant understands what, how and why you did each step.  
 
10) "Then I separated the case from the body, by removing the four case screws." 
11) ―Here‘s the Airworthiness Directive for the case bolts.‖ 
 Pont to Airworthiness Directive. 
12) "The documentation does not say anything about the alignment marks, but they are very 
important."  
13) "I then pulled the rotor out of the body."   
14) "Then, to get the stator out, I removed the 2 stator nuts holding it to the transducer" 
Take your time explaining the steps. Look at participants body gestures for 
understanding of each step. Give them time to look at you! (e.g., noding of 
head, ect. ).
Hand participant the maintenace manuel. Point to each part 
as you describe it.
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15) "Got all that?" 
• If yes, continue describing steps.  
• If no, make sure participant understands what, how and why you did each step.  
16) "I removed the two screws holding down the diode, took it out, and tested it." 
17) "I was finishing up step 7 when you walked in." 
18) "It checked out just fine, so I reinstalled it.‖ 
19) ―To be honest, I went through this kinda quick.  I‘m trying to get out of here.‖ 
19) "That‘s all I got for ya.  Do you have any questions?" 
 
IMPORTANT 
 
 ―When you‘re finished with the alternator, go and get the boss!‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This participant is NOT in the time pressure condition, say the following just before you 
leave:   
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Shift Turnover Actor‘s Time Pressure Script 
 
1) "Hey, how‘s it going?  I‘m Sam.‖ 
2) "This alternator is due for inspection, so I started working on it.‖ 
3) "Let me show you what I have done so far."  
 
4) "Here is the workcard & maintenance manual pages I printed out.  Follow along while I 
describe each step I've done"  
• Give participant the maintenance manual pages & workcard. 
• Point to each part of alternator as you describe how you removed it.  
 
5) "I began by removing the center nut and lock washer" 
6) "Then I took the pulley off" 
7) "Then I removed the fan" 
8) "And next came the spacer" 
9)  "You got all that?"   
• If yes, continue describing steps.  
• If no, make sure participant understands what, how and why you did each step.  
 
10) "Then I separated the case from the body, by removing the four case screws." 
11) ―Here‘s the Airworthiness Directive for the case bolts.‖ 
 Pont to Airworthiness Directive. 
12) "The documentation does not say anything about the alignment marks, but they are very 
important."  
13) "I then pulled the rotor out of the body."   
14) "Then, to get the stator out, I removed the 2 stator nuts holding it to the transducer" 
Take your time explaining the steps. Look at participants body gestures for 
understanding of each step. Give them time to look at you! (e.g., noding of 
head, ect. ).
Hand participant the maintenace manuel. Point to each part 
as you describe it.
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15) "Got all that?" 
• If yes, continue describing steps.  
• If no, make sure participant understands what, how and why you did each step.  
16) "I removed the two screws holding down the diode, took it out, and tested it." 
17) "I was finishing up step 7 when you walked in." 
18) "It checked out just fine, so I reinstalled it.‖ 
19) ―To be honest, I went through this kinda quick.  I‘m trying to get out of here.‖ 
19) "That‘s all I got for ya.  Do you have any questions?" 
 
IMPORTANT 
 
 ―This is an AOG part and the aircraft is waiting to depart.  The boss wants the alternator back 
within the next 20 minutes.‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This participant is in the time pressure condition, say the following just before you 
leave:   
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Appendix G 
Debriefing Form 
Thank you for participating in this study.  This study is examining AMT's completing an 
unfinished maintenance task that was left over from a previous shift.  There is a prominent issue 
regarding critical information transfer in aviation maintenance shift briefings.  Your participation 
will help determine how maintenance personnel may benefit from shift briefings.   
We ask that you do not share your detailed experiences involved in this study with anyone for a 
period of two months.  This will increase confidentiality and prevent learning effects for future 
participants in the study.  Your performance and results in this study will remain anonymous.  
All data gathered will remain under lock and key in the Human Factors Department.  Results will 
only be reported in group numbers (e.g. means, etc.). 
You have the right to request a written copy of the results of this study for your personal records.  
Results will be mailed to you, via email, after the finalization of this study.  
Would you like a copy of the finalized results of this study emailed to you?   
  Yes or No 
  Email address      
 
 
 
 
